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Abstract Many adult anxiety problems emerge in adolescence. Investigating how ado-
lescent anxiety arises and abates is critical for understanding and preventing adult psy-
chiatric problems. Drawing threat interpretations from ambiguous material is linked to
adolescent anxiety but little research has clarified the causal nature of this relationship.
Work in adults using Cognitive Bias Modification of Interpretations (CBM-I) training
show that manipulating negative interpretational style alters negative affect. Conversely,
‘boosting’ positive interpretations improves affect. Here, we extend CBM-I investigations
to adolescents. Thirty-nine adolescents (13–18 years), varying in trait anxiety and self-
efficacy, were randomly allocated to receive positive or negative training. Training-con-
gruent differences emerged for subsequent interpretation style. Induced negative biases
predicted a decline in positive affect in low self-efficacious adolescents only. Tentatively,
our data suggest that cognitive biases predict adolescent affective symptoms in vulnerable
individuals. The acquisition of positive cognitions through training has implications for
prevention.
Keywords Adolescence  Anxiety  Interpretation style 
Cognitive bias modification training
Introduction
Adolescence marks a period of vulnerability for the emergence of anxiety problems [1, 2].
Untreated, adolescent anxiety can generate considerable personal, social and economic
costs. This has prompted calls for research into early preventative interventions [3].
Identifying effective early interventions relies on a better understanding of the risk pro-
cesses by which adolescent anxiety problems arise but also subside. Here we address these
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challenges by assessing whether negative cognitions precipitate symptoms and conversely,
whether boosting positive cognitions reduce symptoms in adolescents. This approach
draws on two sets of findings. First, paralleling adult findings [4], growing data implicate
cognitive biases in child and adolescent anxiety, particularly in the tendency to draw
negative interpretations from ambiguous material [5–8]. Second, recent adult studies show
that inducing functionally similar biases using computerised training can alter mood. These
data therefore suggest that negative interpretative styles causally predict anxiety problems
but also that promoting positive interpretative styles improves symptoms [9]. If such
findings from training studies also hold for adolescent populations, they are ideally placed
for identifying early preventative interventions to attenuate later debilitating outcomes.
More particularly, these interventions would target early risk factors in the development of
anxiety problems. This study therefore aims to assess the plasticity of cognitive styles
using negative and positive training tasks in adolescents.
Cognitive bias modification of interpretation (CBM-I) training tasks present participants
with a series of scenarios describing everyday experiences [10]. The valence of each
scenario remains ambiguous until participants complete a word fragment at the end of the
scenario that ‘disambiguates’ the meaning of the scenario. Depending on the training
condition, word completion resolves the scenario in a positive or negative direction. This
resolution of ambiguity is reinforced by a comprehension question which matches the
valence of the training condition. After repeated exposure to these scenarios, participants
receiving positive CBM-I are more likely to endorse positive interpretations of novel
ambiguous scenarios than those receiving negative CBM-I, an effect that has been widely
replicated in adults [11–17]. Moreover, induced negative interpretative styles are corre-
lated with increases in state anxiety and reduction in positive affect [16, 18], while induced
positive interpretative styles are associated with attenuations of negative affect and
improvements in positive affect [13]. Extending positive training to symptomatic samples
(e.g. high trait anxiety/depression) has yielded similar beneficial effects on mood [19],
negative thought intrusions [20, 21] and anxiety [22–27], presumably through modification
of cognitive biases.
Only a handful of studies have assessed CBM-I training effects in youth [28–30].
Most have focused on pre-adolescent children using age-appropriate training methods
which are not directly comparable with those used in adults. Muris and colleagues [28]
showed that 8–12 year old children trained to select negative interpretations of ambig-
uous situations encountered during a fictional space journey interpreted subsequent sit-
uations as more threatening than positively-trained participants. However this effect only
characterized vulnerable children; that is, those with high trait anxiety. While a follow-
up study replicated training effects on subsequent interpretations, these were no longer
moderated by trait anxiety [29]. Effects of this study’s training paradigm on affective
change were not assessed. In another study, effects of ‘benign’ (positive) CBM-I training
were compared to a ‘no training’ condition in 10–11 year old children with high social
anxiety [30]. Those who received the benign training endorsed fewer negative inter-
pretations of new ambiguous situations relative to their control counterparts. Moreover,
trained participants reported fewer social anxiety symptoms. Thus, consistent findings
across studies provide support for the plasticity of cognitive biases in pre-adolescent
children.
To our knowledge, two studies have investigated the plasticity of adolescent cognitive
biases and their effects on mood [31, 32]. Clarifying the effects of CBM-I on in adolescents
is important for several reasons. Vast biological, cognitive and social changes occur in
adolescence [33]. These developmental differences preclude simple extrapolation of adult
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and even child data to understanding adolescent emotions. Indeed, adolescence is a period
of protracted brain development [34], with increasing maturation of prefrontal cortex
regions. Gradual changes also occur across a number of cognitive domains: abstract rea-
soning and formal operational thought [35], executive function [36], decision-making [37],
social cognition [38] and the cognitive control of responses towards rewarding [39] and
threatening stimuli [40]. In addition, researchers have hypothesized that cognitive schema
continue to consolidate across adolescence [41]. These changes may emerge as a function
of cognitive development [42], and from new and repeated learning experiences [41],
which may occur through exposure to changing environments [43]. Given these devel-
opmental differences, it is unsurprising that linkages between cognitive biases and
symptoms may vary across childhood, adolescence and adulthood. Exemplifying this,
some studies investigating age differences in the role of attributional style in predicting
depressive outcomes across development show that negative attributions only act as a trait-
like diathesis, enhancing depressive responses to stress, in adolescence but not in childhood
[44, 45].
A second reason for considering CBM-I in adolescence independently from adults is
that animal studies suggest this as a developmentally-sensitive period during which
disruptions to maturing brain circuits and associated information-processing can have
life-long consequences for emotional problems [46]. These findings raise the intriguing
question of whether interventions administered in adolescence are particularly effective in
protecting against negative outcomes. Both adolescent CBM-I studies used training tasks
similar in structure but different in content to the adult paradigm [10]. While adolescents
read scenarios and completed word fragments, these scenarios were made more age-
appropriate than those described in the original training set [10]; for example, making
friends at a new school, being asked out on a date, being asked by a teacher to stay
behind class. Both studies replicated adult findings of the training effects on subsequent
interpretations of new ambiguous materials but effects on mood were less clear [31, 32].
In one study, positive training resulted in a significant decrease in negative affect, but
negative training only led to a significant decrease in positive affect in male participants
[32]. In the other study, there were no effects on state anxiety before and after training
[31]. Trait anxiety did not moderate training effects on cognitive or affective measures in
either study. Though encouraging, these adolescent data are preliminary and require
replication.
The aims of the present study were therefore to extend these initial findings to a new
sample of adolescents, a period of unique developmental changes in biology, cognition
and the social environment. Using our adapted adult training methods for adolescents
[32], we predicted that positive training would result in greater endorsement of positive
interpretations of novel ambiguous situations, while negative training would invite the
opposite pattern of effects. Data from a new sample would also clarify the more mixed
findings on mood changes pre- to post-training. Thus, we examined the effects of
positive and negative CBM-I on changes in both positive and negative affect. Third,
given that various adult studies and two of the four studies of youth have emphasized
the effectiveness of training in participants with pre-existing levels of and anxiety
problems, with stronger training effects among vulnerable individuals, we explored the
moderating role of differences in anxious temperaments and self-efficacy on training
effects. Self-efficacy is the capacity to manage threatening events or situations: low self-
efficacious individuals are less confident in their ability to cope with difficult situations.
Thus these individuals are vulnerable for developing emotional symptoms following
negative events [47].
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Method
Participants
Thirty-six adolescents (64% female, 86% Caucasian) aged 13–18 years (mean age: 16.49,
SD: 1.47) were recruited from schools in Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire. Participants
were asked if they had a current or past diagnosis of a mood or anxiety disorder, with those
responding in the affirmative being excluded from the study. This was done for two reasons.
First, for ethical reasons, we did not want to include adolescents with a history of anxiety
problems in the negative training condition, a possibility, given our random allocation of
participants to each training condition. As these are the first data to explore negative training,
we were unsure whether any adverse effects of training would occur and persist in a group of
vulnerable adolescents. Second, there is still relatively little data collected on the effec-
tiveness of our training tool in eliciting cognitive biases and affective change in adolescents.
We therefore considered these data as ‘proof of principle’ that cognitive biases could be
manipulated through external training interventions, before applying these to clinical sam-
ples. As adolescents with mood and anxiety disorders form a heterogeneous group, varying in
severity and length of episodes, number of prior episodes, treatment history, family history,
and co-morbid psychiatric conditions, we did not want these confounding variables to affect
interpretation of training-related differences on cognition and mood. We therefore restricted
our sample to only adolescents with symptoms varying in the normal range.
Participants were randomly allocated to the positive (n = 17) or negative (n = 19)
CBM-I training group. There were no significant differences between the groups in terms
of gender, age, trait anxiety or self-efficacy (all P [ .309; see Table 1). The ethnicity of the
groups was not balanced (P = .024), but all participants spoke English as their first lan-
guage. To ensure that group differences in ethnicity across conditions did not confound
group differences on post-training cognitive and affective measures, preliminary analysis
investigated whether results varied when non-Caucasian participants were excluded from
the analysis. As results remained the same, data from all participants were used in the final
analysis.
Table 1 Participant characteristics and training-related performance indices
Positive training group Negative training group
Demographics
Sample size 17 19
Age 15.94 (1.48) 15.95 (1.35)
Gender 6 male (64.7%) 7 male (63.2%)
11 female (35.3%) 12 female (36.8%)
Ethnicity 70.60% Caucasian 100% Caucasian*
29.4% Other/mixed
Trait anxiety (STAI-T-C) 34.88 (6.86) 32.84 (4.59)
Self-efficacy (SEQ-C) 76.88 (13.04) 80.53 (11.60)
Training performance
% Comprehension questions correct 92.25 (7.70) 90.09 (6.35)
Comprehension question RT (ms) 3,003.71 (717.50) 2,960.87 (908.11)
Word fragment RT (ms) 1,768.80 (348.09) 1,802.80 (409.23)
* P \ .05
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Overview of Procedures
Study procedures followed those of our previous study (See Fig. 1; 32). These were
approved by the Central University Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Oxford. Participants were not informed of the purpose of the training paradigm prior to
training but were fully debriefed at the end of the study. Participants under the age of
16 years provided written assent, with a parent or legal guardian providing informed
consent on their behalf. Consistent with British Psychological Society guidelines for
professional practice, young people between the ages of 16–18 were able to give consent
independently of parental responsibility. Therefore these participants provided informed
written consent. Nonetheless, we also wrote to parents to inform them of the nature of the
research and of their child’s interest in becoming involved prior to their participation.
To maximise the effects of CBM-I training, we instructed participants to read and
imagine each training scenario as if it was happening to themselves [18]. To make the use
of imagery explicit, all participants received two ‘imagery’ exercises prior to training [32].
The first involved imagining coming home from school while the second involved
imagining biting into a lemon. Following training, participants completed a 10-min filler
task, to allow group differences in mood that emerged through training to dissipate. This
procedure is standard in most CBM-I studies [10], allowing group differences in the
interpretation of new ambiguous events to be assessed without confounds associated with
mood differences. The filler task was a picture rating task in which participants rated 60
emotionally neutral pictures on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) between ‘very unpleasant’
(0 cm) and ‘very pleasant’ (9.8 cm). None of the participants guessed the true purpose of
the study or reported distress beyond the debriefing session. Both CBM-I training and the
test of induced bias was carried out on a laptop computer using E-Prime 2.0 [48].
Fig. 1 Overview of experimental procedures and examples of training and test materials. CBM-I cognitive
bias modication of interpretations training; VAS visual analogue scale; T1 time 1; T2 time 2; T3 time 3; T4
time 4
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CBM-I Training Task
In our previous study we developed an adolescent version of the CBM-I training task by
including scenarios relevant to adolescents, such as social relationships, school and extra-
curricular pursuits [32]. These scenarios were piloted in 3 adolescents aged 14–16 years
for readability and relevance.
The CBM-I training task consisted of one practice trial followed by 60 recorded trials,
presented as five blocks of 12. Each trial presented a short description of an everyday
scenario which remained emotionally ambiguous until the final word, which was presented
as a word fragment on the following screen. Participants had to identify the word from the
fragment as quickly as possible by typing its first missing letter. This word resolved the
ambiguity of the scenario, leading to a positive interpretation for the majority of trials in
the positive condition, and a negative interpretation for the majority of trials in the negative
condition. In each condition, five scenarios (one in each block of 12 trials) resolved with
the opposite valence (negative in the positive condition and vice versa) and five scenarios
(again one in each block of 12 trials) resolved neutrally. These items were included to
obscure the purpose of the training. Once the word fragment was correctly completed,
participants were asked a comprehension question for which the correct answer (yes or no)
was based on the intended emotional interpretation of the training scenario. Participants
only viewed the comprehension question if they had completed the word fragment cor-
rectly. All comprehension questions were followed by feedback (‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘wrong’’).
Therefore both the word fragment completion and comprehension question reinforced the
intended emotional valence of the scenario. Participants were instructed to respond to the
comprehension questions as quickly and accurately as possible. An example of an
ambiguous scenario is: ‘‘During maths, you are asked by the teacher to write the homework
on the board. When you have finished, your teacher looks at it with an expression of ‘‘agr–
m-nt’’ (positive condition) or ‘‘disagr–m-nt’’ (negative condition). The comprehension
question following this item is: ‘‘Does your teacher approve of your work?’’ The correct
response is ‘‘Yes’’ for participants receiving positive training and ‘‘No’’ for those receiving
negative training. The order of scenarios in each block was randomised across participants.
Assessment of Training Effects on Interpretation Bias
The test consisted of two phases (Fig. 1). In the first phase, ten ambiguous scenarios were
presented, each with a title. Participants were given the same instructions as in the training
phase. Unlike training items, completing word fragments did not disambiguate the emo-
tional valence of the scenarios; the comprehension questions also had no emotional con-
tent. In the second phase, participants viewed the title of each scenario they had seen,
followed by four statements relating to that scenario. Participants were informed that the
sentences resembled the scenario, but none would be an exact match. They were instructed
to rate statements on their similarity to the scenarios viewed in the first phase on a scale
from 1 to 4 (1: not similar at all; 2: not so similar; 3: similar; 4: very similar). These
statements, ordered randomly, included one positive and one negative interpretation of the
scenario (targets). The other two statements were also positively and negatively valenced
but were not valid interpretations of the previously presented scenarios (foils).
Bias induction was successful if the negative CBM-I training group rated negative
targets as more similar to the original ambiguous scenarios, and the positive CBM-I
training group rated positive targets as more similar. This pattern of results suggests that
the novel ambiguous situations were interpreted consistently with the valence of the
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training [10]. Similarity of foils assessed whether training induced a general affective bias
towards items of a particular valence.
Assessment of Training Effects on Mood Changes
Mood was assessed at four time-points during the study (T1–T4) using VAS versions of the
Positive and Negative Affect Scale for Children (PANAS-C; [49]). Eight emotions from
the original PANAS-C formed a negative affect VAS (nervous, sad, upset, worried, anx-
ious, miserable, scared, gloomy) while 4 items formed a positive affect scale (happy, calm,
cheerful, energetic). Participants indicated how much of each emotion they were feeling at
that moment, on a line between ‘‘not (emotion) at all’’ (0 cm) and ‘‘very (emotion)’’
(9.8 cm). VASs can be effective in detecting the influence of an intervention on a
dependent variable [50].
Questionnaire Measures
All participants completed the Trait scale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children
(STAI-T-C)[51]. This comprises 20 items, where participants rate how frequently common
anxiety symptoms apply to them (e.g. ‘‘I worry too much’’). This measure has high internal
reliability (Cronbach’s a = .91) and correlates well with other measures of child and
adolescent anxiety, such as the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale [52].
Participants also completed the Self-Efficacy Questionnaire for Children (SEQ-C)[53].
The SEQ-C is a 24-item measure of self-efficacy measuring perceptions of personal
strength in the academic, social and emotional domains. Participants read questions about
their personal abilities (e.g. ‘‘How well can you control your feelings?’’) and indicated their
answers on a five point scale (1: not at all, 5: very well). Previous investigations of self-
efficacy have excluded three of the SEQ-C questionnaire items from their analyses because
they did not load convincingly on a particular domain of self efficacy in factor analysis
[53]. To maintain consistency, the same three items were excluded in this study. This
measure has high internal reliability (Cronbach’s a = .88) [53]. Criterion validity has been
established through negative correlations with psychological problems and positive cor-
relations with measures of life satisfaction [54].
Statistical Analyses
All paired- and independent- sample t-tests were two-tailed. Wherever assumptions of
normality were violated, log transforms were used in the analysis. Independent sample t-
tests were first carried out to assess training differences on task performance including
reaction times (RTs) to completion of word fragments and comprehension questions, and
the percentage of correctly answered comprehension questions. Next, we carried out an
independent sample t-test on the positive and negative mood ratings at all time points to
assess baseline differences in mood or any confound of mood differences immediately
before the interpretation bias test.
To examine training effects on interpretations of new ambiguous material, a 2 9 2 9 2
mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) assessed the effects of two within-subjects
factors (recognition statement type: target vs. foil; recognition statement valence: positive
vs. negative) and one between-subjects factor (training group: positive vs. negative con-
dition) on similarity ratings. Subsequent analyses included either: gender (male, female),
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trait anxiety group (above median vs. below median) and self-efficacy group (above
median vs. below median) as additional between-subject factors. The Greenhouse–Geisser
(G–G) correction was applied. Effect sizes of within-group and between-group differences
on negative and positive targets were estimated with Cohen’s d. To examine training
effects on mood change, 2 9 2 9 2 mixed measures ANOVAs were performed, with time
as a within subjects-factor (T1 vs. T2) and training group (positive vs. negative) as
between-subjects factors. Again, subsequent analysis included gender, trait anxiety and
self-efficacy as between-subject factors. The G–G correction was applied. Analyses were
carried out separately for positive and negative affect consistent with our previous study
[32].
Results
Training Effects on Task Performance
No significant differences were found between training groups on average RTs to word
fragments (t(34) = -.27, P = .79) or comprehension question completion (t(34) = .16,
P = .88) (Table 1). Nor were there differences in the percentage of comprehension
questions answered correctly (t(34) = .93, P = .36).
Training Effects on Interpretation Bias
A main effect of recognition statement type emerged (F(1,34) = 62.05, P \ .001), sug-
gesting that similarity ratings were higher for targets than foils. We also found a 2-way
interaction between training group and recognition statement valence (F(1,34) = 11.74,
P \ .01), that was further modified by recognition statement type (F(1,34) = 8.09,
P \ .01). To decompose these two- and three-way interactions, separate analyses were
conducted for targets and for foils. For targets, the mixed-measures ANOVA showed a
significant interaction between training group and valence of the recognition statement
(F(1,30) = 16.34, P \ .001). Figure 2 illustrates this interaction as positive targets (PT)
Fig. 2 Similarity ratings for
positive and negative targets and
foils acorss training groups in the
testing phase. Higher similarity
ratings reflect greater
resemblance of the item to the
ambiguous situation. *P \ .5,
**P \ .1
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being rated as significantly more similar to original scenarios than negative targets (NT) in
those who had received positive training (t(16) = -2.47, P = .025; PT Mean = 2.62, NT
Mean = 2.23, Cohen’s d = .76). Individuals who had received negative training gave
higher similarity ratings to NT than PT (t(18) = 2.69, P = .015; NT Mean = 2.77, PT
Mean = 2.25, Cohen’s d = .97). The difference in the ratings of NT between training
groups and PT between training groups were also significant (NT: t(34) = -3.10, P = .004,
Cohen’s d = 1.03; PT: t(34) = 2.15, P = .039, Cohen’s d = .71).
For foils, a significant training-group-by-recognition-valence interaction also emerged
(F(1,30) = 10.37, P = .003). Positively-trained individuals gave higher recognition ratings
to positive foils (PF) than negative foils (NF) (t(16) = -3.11, P = .015; PF Mean = 2.23,
NF Mean = 1.90), as shown in Fig. 2. Negatively-trained adolescents showed a trend for
rating NF as more similar to the original scenarios than PF (PF Mean = 1.97, NF
Mean = 2.10). For both target and foil data, no other significant main or interaction effects
emerged, including for gender, trait anxiety group and self-efficacy group.
Training Effects on Mood Measures
Negative affect scores at all time-points were skewed so data were log transformed prior to
analysis. Groups differed in negative affect at T1 (t(34) = 2.37, P = .024), with the
positive group reporting more negative affect before training (Table 2). No differences
were found for positive affect at T1 Table 2.
Table 2 Mean negative and positive affect at each time-point
Means (SD)
T1 T2 T3 T4
Positive training group
Positive affect
All 6.23 (.92) 5.75 (1.14) 5.64 (1.80) 5.35 (1.67)
Males 6.37 (1.14) 5.67 (1.60) 5.70 (1.94) 6.02 (1.60)
Females 6.15 (.83) 5.80 (.89) 5.61 (1.80) 4.98 (1.66)
Negative affect
All 2.05 (1.49) 1.95 (1.54) 1.77 (1.33) 3.52 (1.16)
Males 1.77 (1.43) 1.82 (1.68) 1.63 (1.30) 3.73 (.82)
Females 2.19 (1.57) 2.01 (1.53) 1.85 (1.41) 3.40 (1.33)
Negative training group
Positive affect
All 6.75 (1.17) 6.00 (1.12) 6.07 (1.43) 5.94 (1.07)
Males 7.63 (.75) 6.50 (.85) 6.76 (1.03) 6.31 (1.00)
Females 6.24 (1.08) 5.76 (1.22) 5.66 (1.51) 5.72 (1.09)
Negative affect
All 1.01 (.94) 1.25 (1.29) .91 (.81) 3.53 (.75)
Males .57 (.43) 1.14 (.60) .72 (.50) 3.90 (.91)
Females 1.29 (1.06) 1.31 (1.58) 1.02 (.96) 3.31 (.56)
TI before training, T2 after training, T3 after picture rating filler task, T4 after recognition test. All values
given are in cm along visual analogue scales (minimum = 0, maximum = 9.8). Higher values indicate
higher levels of the emotion
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For positive affect, there were no significant effects of time, training group or their
interaction. Neither gender nor trait anxiety group exerted main effects or interacted with
these variables. However there was a significant 3-way interaction between time, training
group and self-efficacy (F(1,31) = 4.76, P = .037). Figure 3 shows that of the individuals
who received negative training, those who reported lower self-efficacy showed a signifi-
cant reduction in positive affect from pre- to post-training (t(6) = 3.50, P = .013, T1
Mean = 6.67, T2 Mean = 5.30). Changes in positive affect were not significant in neg-
atively-trained high self-efficacious individuals. Nor were there significant changes in
positive affect from T1 to T2 among positively-trained individuals.
These results did not characterise changes in negative affect.
Discussion
Several novel findings emerge from these data. First, clear support for previous findings
emerged [31, 32], notably that negative and positive interpretation biases can be suc-
cessfully induced in adolescents using CBM-I training. Thus these data are consistent with
prior findings in adults and pre-adolescent children. Following positive CBM-I participants
endorsed positive interpretations as more similar to previously viewed ambiguous sce-
narios than negative interpretations in a surprise recognition test. The opposite pattern of
similarity ratings was observed following negative CBM-I. These findings could not be
explained by participants making mood-congruent judgements, as there were no significant
differences in mood between the two training groups at the time of bias testing. Addi-
tionally, no significant difference in ability on the training task was found between training
groups, as indicated by RTs to word fragments and comprehension questions, and per-
centage of comprehension questions answered correctly. ‘Target’ ratings of similarity to
the originally-presented scenario were higher (i.e. rated as more similar to the original
scenarios) than ‘foil’ similarity ratings, suggesting that the results are based on an induced
interpretation bias rather than general affective priming from the training task. Training
effects were not modified by gender, trait anxiety, or self-efficacy.
The second key finding was that while there were no overall changes in positive and
negative affect associated with training across participants, significant reductions in
positive affect characterized adolescents with low self-efficacy following negative training.
Fig. 3 The three-way interaction
between positive affect
(time 1 vs. time 2), training group
(positive vs. negative) and
self-efficacy group (below
median vs. above median)
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These effects occurred independently of trait anxiety. Adolescents reporting lower self-
efficacy were more susceptible to the attenuation of positive mood following negative
training. However, they did not differ on the strength of the cognitive bias induced. Thus
differences in mood change were unlikely to relate to differences in induced bias.
Our data promise to inform theories and therapies of adolescent anxiety problems. Data
from both this and other training tasks persuasively suggest that child and adolescent cog-
nitive biases are plastic [28–32]. Moreover, our effect sizes relating to induced biases
through training were generally large (Cohen’s d = .70–1.03). This is consistent with a large
body of research showing that cognitive biases can be acquired through social modelling
procedures, such as between parents and their offspring [55]. Ours and other data extend
these findings by suggesting that cognitive styles can be explicitly taught, through repeated
exposure and reinforcement learning. These findings lend further credence to the aspect of
cognitive-behavioural therapy that explicitly targets cognitive bias change, by providing a
controlled, experimental model of processes that contribute to therapeutic change.
Perhaps initially a little disappointing, our findings do not show that cognitive change
serves as a precursor to mood change in general across all adolescents. This is not par-
ticularly surprising taken in context of adult data: although instances of training effects on
mood change have been found [56, 57], others have reported no effects on mood [14, 16,
58, 59] or mixed results [17, 21, 60]. Even when mood-change differences are present, it is
not clear whether these manifest through changes in negative affect or positive affect. It is
also not clear if mood effects occur because of the induced cognitive bias although more
sophisticated mediation analysis suggests that this is plausible [27]. These mixed findings
with respect to mood effects complicate inferences about the causality of the interpretation
bias in anxiety. What appears more consistent from adult findings is that training affects
stress reactivity [61]: cognitive biases do not act directly on short-term fluctuations in
mood, but instead, as postulated by stress-diathesis theories, induce changes in stress
responsiveness. Such parallel data in adolescents are lacking but form the basis of exciting
new investigations. Our adolescent data do however show that a subset of individuals
manifest reductions in positive affect following negative bias induction. As low self-
efficacy may comprise a vulnerability factor for mood and anxiety problems [47] it is
interesting that adolescents with lower self-efficacy responded with reductions in positive
affect after exposure to negative interpretations of situations. If these data are replicated,
then improving self-efficacy might be an important focus for preventing negative emo-
tional reactions to stressful events in the general adolescent population, but in cognitively-
vulnerable individuals in particular.
While these findings carry a number of interesting implications, some caveats need to be
considered. First, the sample size was small and may have decreased the capacity to detect
weak effects of training group differences on mood change across all adolescents. It is also
unclear whether the current adolescents were representative of the general population. As
adolescents were told that the task involved reading a number of scenarios, our volunteer
sample may have self-selected on the basis of reading ability. To examine training effects
in a broader range of adolescents with differing cognitive capacities, including younger
participants, future studies could develop auditory training tasks, although caution over
differences as a function of training modality needs to be considered [62]. Second, ado-
lescents assigned to positive training reported significantly higher mean negative affect
prior to bias induction. As baseline differences normalised after training, it remains pos-
sible that initial high levels of negative affect in the positive training condition masked any
potential group differences in changes in negative affect. Third, we included no baseline
measures of interpretation bias, relying instead on post-training differences on
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interpretational style. Finally, because of issues relating to the length of testing, we only
used visual analogue scales, using items from the PANAS-C to measure mood changes in
the study. Future studies should replicate these findings with more valid measures of mood,
such as the complete version of the PANAS-C [49].
The plasticity of training biases, particularly positive ones in this age range, are
encouraging for the planning of new therapeutic and preventative techniques for young
people. While current psychological interventions such as CBT are effective, outcomes can
also be highly variable [63]. Availability and access to CBT in youth may also be limited
[64]. Tentatively, our data are suggestive that training effects on cognitive biases impinge
equally across all adolescents: males and females, those with low and high self-efficacy,
and those with low and high trait anxiety. Training tasks such as CBM-I could therefore be
applied as an evidence-based adjunct intervention to CBT, for example serving as a
‘booster’ that targets cognitive bias specifically between sessions. Alternatively, CBM-I
could be used as a prevention tool in adolescents at-risk for anxiety problems. Logistically,
the ease with which CBM-I can be computerised will no doubt increase its appeal for a
younger, computer-literate audience. However before CBM-I can be used more widely as a
clinical tool, several outstanding questions need to be resolved. First, the current data do
not speak to the long-term effects of training. Nor do they inform the generalizability of
training to the interpretation of real-life ambiguous social situations and to mood changes
associated with stressful social situations. The number of training sessions required to
induce long-term cognitive and affective change will also need to be investigated. Finally,
the effectiveness of CBM-I will need to be verified in clinical samples, where more
extreme levels of trait anxiety and self-efficacy are present. These can be achieved using
multi-session randomised controlled trial studies, designs that have already been applied to
other cognitive training packages, such as attention bias modification tasks with exciting
results [65]. While adolescent CBM-I research is still in its infancy, it clearly has the
potential to transform current psychological interventions.
Summary
In the present study, we investigated whether a new, adolescent, computerised cognitive
training package was effective at generating positive and negative interpretations of
ambiguous information. We also assessed whether these induced biases altered mood
change. As expected, adolescents assigned to receive positive training drew more positive
interpretations of new ambiguous information than adolescents who had received negative
training. Reductions in positive mood following negative training only characterised
adolescents with low self-efficacy. If replicated, these data support a causal link between
negative cognitive biases and mood in vulnerable adolescents. Perhaps more importantly,
these data point to the potential of a new tool that can be applied in clinical settings, either
as an early treatment or preventative intervention of adolescent anxiety.
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